Abstract: We analyze agents' decisions to act as producers or intermediaries using equilibrium search theory. Extending previous analyses in various ways, we ask when intermediation emerges and study its efficiency. In one version of the framework, meant to resemble retail, middlemen hold goods, which entails (storage) costs; that model always displays uniqueness and simple transition dynamics. In another version, middlemen hold assets, which entails negative costs, that is, positive returns; that model can have multiple equilibria and complicated belief-based dynamics. These results are consistent with the venerable view that intermediation in financial markets is more prone to instability than in goods markets.
Introduction
This paper studies intermediation in markets for goods and markets for assets, building on the search-and-bargaining framework of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) , hereafter RW. The analysis extends existing versions of RW on several dimensions, and in particular, we endogenize market composition by letting agents choose to act as either middlemen or producers. This leads to the following: a version of the model designed to resemble goods markets, in a simple but reasonable way, has a unique equilibrium under standard assumptions; a version designed to resemble asset markets, under similar assumptions, can have multiple equilibria that can be ranked in terms of efficiency. For this result the sets of producers and middlemen must be endogenous -if they are exogenous uniqueness obtains in markets for assets as well as goods.
As background, first note that the original RW environment had no cost of production or search, equal numbers of producers and consumers, symmetric bargaining, and a fixed number of middlemen. In equilibrium middlemen participate in the market iff they have a better search technology than producers, as is efficient. In Nosal et al. (2015) we extended this to allow more general bargaining and costs, but that was relatively straightforward because, following RW, we maintained linear utility, only considered steady states, restricted inventories to {0 1}, and kept the sets of producers and middlemen fixed. This paper relaxes all of these restrictions, with the key generalization being that agents decide to act as producers or middlemen, and that requires a rather different approach. 1 For experts in search theory we can explain why it requires a different approach, although this can be skipped without loss of continuity. First, previous RW models take the arrival rates α = {  } as exogenous, where   is the rate at which type  meets type . Under certain conditions that is legitimate because there exists a distribution of types, say n = {  }, consistent with α, uniform random matching, and the identities implied by bilateral meetings,     =     . While it is convenient to take α as fixed, we cannot do so when n is endogenous. Hence, we use uniform random matching,   =     , where   is a baseline arrival rate for type . But now the relevant identities imply   =  ∀, and in particular   =   , so we must abandon RW's idea that middlemen are useful when      . Fortunately, other factors here take over for arrival rates, including bargaining powers and storage costs or returns. 1 We then distinguish between markets for goods and markets for assets as follows: as in retail markets, holding inventories of goods entails a storage cost; holding inventories of assets instead entails a positive return, or a negative cost, as is potentially the case with, e.g., houses, art, productive capital, etc. Now there can also be costs to safely storing assets, but it is worth considering the case where the net return is positive, because that is necessary (not sufficient) for generating multiple steady states and endogenous dynamics. Of course, it is well known that one can generate multiplicity and dynamics in search theory with a variety of other devices, e.g., increasing returns in matching or production technologies (Diamond 1982; Mortensen 1999 ). We eschew those devices to concentrate on something new, complementarities in decisions by middlemen to adopt either buy-and-hold or buy-and-sell strategies.
Our producers generate goods, or assets, like capital, and trade them to end users. They may also trade them to middlemen, who may or may not trade them to end users. With goods as defined here (storage has a cost) the trading decision of a middleman meeting an end user is trivial, because buy-and-hold strategies cannot be optimal with negative returns. With assets as defined here (storage has a positive return) the decision is not trivial. To motivate why this is interesting, our asset market intermediaries can be interpreted in a stylized way as financial institutions, acquiring capital from originators and choosing when to pass it on.
Our results thus provide support for the notion that financial institutions are less stable than other intermediaries, since we get multiplicity and belief-based volatility in intermediated markets for assets but not goods. 2 For the intuition, suppose first that middlemen pass capital inventories on to 2 The venerable notion that financial intermediation engenders instability/fragility is commonly associated with names like Minsky, Kindleberger and Keynes; for more recent expositions see, e.g., Akerlof and Shiller (2009) or Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) . As regards banking, in particular, Rolnick and Weber (1986) say "Historically, even some of the staunchest proponents of laissez-faire have viewed banking as inherently unstable and so requiring government intervention." One such proponent is Friedman (1960) , who opposed regulation of virtually everything except banks. Now this paper is not about unstable banking or credit arrangements (see Vives 2016 and Gu et al. 2013 on those issues); it is about instability in intermediated asset markets, but that seems at least as relevant. end users. Then lots of middlemen will be searching for new capital, leading to high producer profit and hence many producers. With more producers in the market it is easier for middlemen to get capital, thus rationalizing their decision to trade it away and making active intermediation an equilibrium for some parameters. Now suppose middlemen keep capital for themselves. Then they are more likely to already have capital, leading to lower profits and fewer producers. This makes it harder for middlemen to get capital, thus rationalizing their decision to not trade it away in another equilibrium for the same parameters.
Moreover, the equilibria can be welfare ranked -having middlemen trade with end users is better -and, again, the multiplicity can only arise when the return on inventories is positive and when the composition of the market is endogenous.
Section 2 describes a general benchmark environment. Then we analyze markets for goods and markets for assets separately, the former in Sections 3-4, and the latter in Sections 5-7. Section 8 discusses robustness, including, in particular, an extension that allows general inventories, while the baseline model restricts inventories to {0 1}.
3 Section 9 contains concluding remarks. Some other extensions and technical proofs are in the Appendices.
4 3 Having inventories in {0 1} is special, although as in search theory going back to Diamond (1982) it allows one to make some salient points succinctly. In addition to studies of middlemen like RW, examples include models of monetary exchange (e.g., , banking (e.g., Cavalcanti and Wallace 1999), OTC financial markets (e.g., Duffie et al. 2005) , unemployment (e.g., Pissarides 2000) and partnership formation (e.g., Burdett and Coles 1997) . Still, we go beyond {0 1} to see if our main results hinge on it; they do not. 4 Here we say more about the literature, although it can be skipped if one prefers to see the theory first. Related papers include Bigalser (1993), Wright (1995) , Li (1998) ) and references therein for more on OTC market intermediation. As a referee suggested, we mention that in those models one's buyer/seller status changes over time -one can buy a house, car, bond... and sell it later. We instead have permanent buyer/seller types, as in RW, but changing that may be interesting in future work. It was also suggested that we put up front a comparison to the monetary theory surveyed by Lagos et al. (2017) or Nosal and Rocheteau (2017) . Those models have multiplicities ostensibly related to ours, but the mechanism is actually different. There, a seller's decision to accept an asset in exchange depends on what others accept; here the crucial element is strategic interaction in middlemen's decision to adopt buy-and-hold or buy-and-trade strategies. Also, our effect requires endogenous market composition, which is not the case in monetary theory. 3 
Environment
There is a continuum of infinitely-lived agents of different types. Measure   of them are end users, or consumers, labeled . The rest choose to be producers, middlemen or nonparticipants, labeled  ,  or , with measure   ,   or   . As discussed below, the market is active if parameters are such that type  produce, in which case they trade with , and might trade with , when they meet. They meet bilaterally in continuous time, with the Poisson rate at which any type  meets type  given by   =   Σ    . Note that this displays constant returns since, e.g., doubling   ∀ doubles the number of meetings and leaves   the same. To ease notation, we normalize   +   +   +   = 1 and  = 1, with no loss of generality, and write n = (
There are two tradeable objects: , which is indivisible and storable; and , which is divisible but not storable. Type  produces  at cost 0, which for our applications is without loss of generality. Type  does not produce but can acquire  from  . Type  get payoff  from acquiring , which can be interpreted as them consuming it in markets for goods or holding/investing it in markets for assets. Under either interpretation,  and  can hold , but only 0 or 1 unit at a time (this is relaxed below). The costs of holding/storing  for  and  are   and   , which are positive in markets for goods and negative in markets for assets. In the latter case we use   = −   0 to denote the flow return on asset holdings. The other tradeable object  is used as a payment instrument when acquiring . It can be produced by anyone at unit cost and consumed by anyone for utility  (). As a benchmark we set  () = , which means transferable utility; the general case is studied in the Appendix.
Type  agents always have 1 unit of , while  can have 0 or 1 in inventory.
Let  be the fraction of  holding . This increases at rate     (1 − ) (the measure of  meeting  without ) and decreases at rate      , where  is the probability  trades  to  (the measure of  meeting  with  and trading).
For now we focus on steady states; dynamics are studied in Section 7.
Bargaining determines the terms of trade: agents  and  split the total surplus with   denoting the share (bargaining power) of , and   = 1 −   , as follows from various common solution concepts (e.g., Nash or Kalai bargaining). Hence when they trade  pays   or   to  or , while  pays   to  . The surplus when  trades with  , e.g., is  −   =   , since   =   , given that for both the continuation values and outside options cancel. 6 To keep track of
Next let   be  's value function, let  0 or  1 be 's value function when he has 0 or 1 unit of , let   and   = 0 be 's and 's value functions, and let
Eliminating the 's from the  's using the bargaining solution, we get standard dynamic programming equations
where in steady state  = 0. In words, (2) says: the flow value   is the rate at which  meets  times his share of the surplus; plus the rate at which he meets  without  times his share of that surplus; minus storage cost; plus (out of steady state) a capital gain  . Similar stories apply to (3)-(5).
Next, for the decision of a nonconsumer to act as type  or , we assume that if he chooses  he starts without  for payoff  0 (e.g., if he produced  as a type  , he must sacrifice it to acquire the middleman technology). This implies
and, in particular,
A steady state equilibrium is defined as a nonnegative list h V ni such that:  satisfies (1); V satisfies (2)- (5);
and n satisfies (6) . Given h V ni we can compute payments y, the spread
Goods Market Equilibrium
When    0 it is immediate that  = 1 ( with  always trades with ).
Hence there are three possible outcomes. A class 0 equilibrium is one where A class 2 equilibrium is one where    0,    0 and   = 0, with production and intermediation. In principle we can have    0,    0 and    0, too, but it only occurs in a measure 0 set of parameters, so it is ignored. We consider the other possibilities in turn, with detailed proofs in the Appendix.
Consider first class 0 equilibrium, with   =   = 0. This requires   ≤ 0 This requires   ≥ 0 and   ≥  0 , so that type  agents do not want to deviate and become type  or . It is easy to check   ≥ 0 iff   ≤  , and
where  ≡     . Since (2)- (5) are linear, there cannot be multiple class 1 equilibria.
Lemma 2 A class 1 equilibrium exists iff   ≤  and   ≥  (  ), where  is defined in (7) . When it exists it is unique.
Consider finally class 2, with       0. Here it is convenient to proceed using  and later recover n. We need  ∈ (0), where = 1 −   . Now routine algebra reduces   =  0 to () = 0, where
is obtained by replacing   and   with their values in terms of , and the coefficients are 
Also, since there is exactly one  ∈ (0) with  () = 0, and again (2)-(5) are linear, there cannot be multiple class 2 equilibria.
exists it is unique.
The results are shown in the left panel of Fig. 1 , drawn with  (0)  0, although  (0)  0 is also possible. They accord well with intuition -e.g., intermediation requires   not too high, naturally, but also requires   neither too high nor too low, since  does not produce when   is very high and produces but does not need  when   is very low. The equilibrating force is this: When   increases,  is less likely to meet , and when he does it is more likely  already has . Hence raising   lowers   , which is why we get uniqueness.
Intermediation can be essential in the sense used by monetary theorists: an institution like money is said to be essential if the set of outcomes that can 8 be supported as equilibria expands when money is introduced. For money or intermediation the concept is nontrivial, since both are inessential in standard general equilibrium theory. Here, in the region where class 2 equilibrium exists with     , production depends on middlemen: if we were to eliminate , say by taxation, the market shuts down. There is more to say about efficiency in Section 4, but for now we summarize the above results as follows:
Proposition 1 With    0 equilibrium exists and is generically unique, as shown in Fig. 1 . For some parameters intermediation is essential.
Additional insights come from changing parameters in class 2 equilibrium. To that end the following is useful:
Based on this it is immediate that
This accords well with intuition: if   is higher, we get fewer producers, and so middlemen hold  with lower probability. Less intuitive is this:
The case     is surprising: how can we get more middlemen when   is higher? This is answered in Section 4.
7 7 Among other comparative statics, we showed that increases in   work like decreases in   , as both make intermediation more profitable, with   operating in the search process and   in the bargaining process. We also worked out the effects of demand on the intensive margin (changes in ) and extensive margin (changes in   ), calculated the effects of parameters on y and , etc. but omit the results in the interest of space. 
Goods Market Efficiency
Consider the planner problem with objective function
where the first (second) term is the gain from direct (indirect) trade. 8 The
Appendix shows:
Proposition 2 The efficient outcome exists and is generically unique. It has
where  there is also a holdup problem when  meets , but now other forces arise. One is this: when agents act as type  they neglect making it harder for other  's to meet 's and easier for 's to meet  's, as usual in search theory. Another, more novel, force is this: higher   implies higher , making it harder for  to trade when they meet . Balancing these forces leads to a version of efficiency results going back to Mortensen (1982) and Hosios (1990) applicable to our three-sided market. 
Next consider how the optimum varies with   . Similar to equilibrium, we
How can higher   lead to more middlemen? To answer that we use this:
This says that an increase in   always reduces the stock of inventories held by middlemen,      , but there are two ways to make that happen. One is to reduce    , which in steady state means higher   ; the other is to reduce   , which
it is optimal to use the extensive margin and reduce    ; when       it is optimal to use the intensive margin and reduce   , which means higher    . This explains the planner's choices; the idea is similar for equilibrium.
Asset Market Equilibrium
Suppose now that storing  is profitable. As a colorful example, suppose  is a painter,  is a collector and  is an art dealer, and that   = −   0 because paintings generate payoffs simply from gazing at them, or from charging admission to 's gallery. Will  trade  to ? Of course the answer depends on fundamentals -i.e., who values it more -but also on the ease or difficulty with which inventory can be replaced and that depends on equilibrium considerations.
Indeed, one might say that liquidity is a key factor: the market can be said to be more liquid when it is easier to get , which is the case when   is bigger, which is the case when  is bigger, because that makes   higher. This is relevant for any asset with positive net returns, not only art. As a financial application, suppose  produces or otherwise obtains capital suitable for investment by either  or . Then a type  agent with capital may not want to pass it on to , again depending on fundamentals like   , but also on the strategies of others. This interpretation allows us to investigate the view (recall fn. 2) that financial institutions may be more unstable/fragile that other intermediaries, such as those in retail goods markets.
As another application,  can be a interpreted as housing that provides utility as shelter, in which case  must decide whether to keep it as a residence or flip it to . With this interpretation we can investigate the idea that real estate markets are susceptible to "hot and cold spells" depending on the speculations of flippers.
Of course, the model is quite abstract, but we think it still provides insights into these kinds of applications. Moreover, our position is not that the only relevant distinction between goods or assets is    0 or    0; our position is that it is a distinction that is interesting because of the way it affects results. 9 While  = 1 is immediate for    0, it is not for    0, and so there are more candidate equilibria. We call   = 0 and  = 1 a class 1  equilibrium, with  indicating  trades  to  (in fact there are no type  agents on the equilibrium path, but off this path type  with  would trade it to ).
Similarly,   = 0 and  = 0 is a class 1  equilibrium, with  indicating  keeps . Also,   = 0 and  ∈ (0 1) is a class 1  equilibrium, with  indicating  randomizes, but we ignore it because it can only be an equilibrium for nongeneric parameters. We also ignore   = 1 −   , which is uninteresting, because there is no production, and unnecessary for our purposes. Thus, in addition to 1  and 1  , the other relevant candidates all have   ∈ (0 1 −   ) and either:  = 1, which is a class 2  equilibrium;  = 0, which is a class 2  equilibrium; or  ∈ (0 1), which is a class 2  equilibrium. See Table 1 . 
Lemma 7 states some results formally, but they are perhaps better understood from Fig. 3 , which in one panel has the negative quadrant of (     ), space and in the other the positive quadrant of (     ) space, which we find easier to interpret.
While there are various issues that can be discussed using the results -e.g., as
in the model with    0, one can ask about the parameters that are more likely to make intermediation an equilibrium outcome -but we highlight the following:
Suppose   is not too high, which is necessary for    0. Then for   very high we get  = 0 and for   very low we get  = 1, naturally, but for   neither too high nor too low there coexist a 2  equilibrium with  = 0, a 2  equilibrium with  = 1, and a 2  equilibrium with  ∈ (0 1).
Also define b (  ) to be the lower root of the quadratic given in the proof in the
We conclude that    0 implies the liquidity of the market, and in particular whether  is passed on to  or "hoarded" by , can be a self-fulfilling prophecy,
i.e., not pinned down by fundamentals. This constitutes part (i) of Proposition 4. Part (ii) says that if n is fixed we get back uniqueness even with    0, confirming that multiplicity requires both    0 and endogenous   .
Proposition 4 (i) With    0 equilibrium exists. As shown in Fig. 3 , ∀     where   0, and   neither too high nor too low class 2  , 2  and 2  equilibria coexist.
(ii) If   and   are fixed equilibrium is unique:
Asset Market Efficiency
One can emulate the method in Section 4 for the planner, but now we have to choose  as well as   , so the details are relegated to a Supplemental Appendix, and here we report just a few findings. 10 First, depending on parameters   can be too big or too small, as in the model with    0. However, different from that model, with    0 it is not possible to find 's such that equilibrium is efficient even if we select the best equilibrium when there is multiplicity. To see this, note that the Supplemental Appendix shows the borders between regions are the same for the equilibrium and planner iff   =   =   = 1; but with those 's the values of   in the 2  region are different. 10 The method involves checking each (    ) pair in Table 1 to determine the parameters for which it solves the planner problem. To be a solution (   ) must satisfy these conditions: a corner solution  = 0 ( = 1) requires  decreasing in  at  = 0 (increasing in  at  = 1); a corner solution for   requires something similar; and interior solutions for  ∈ (0 1) or   ∈ (0 1 −   ) must satisfy standard FOC's and SOC's. After exhausting the candidates in Table 1 , we can partition parameter space into regions as follows: for big   the efficient outcome is 1  or 1  as   is small or big; for small   it is 2  or 2  as   is small or big. The result is simple enough, and qualitatively the four outcomes are similar to the four classes of equilibria analyzed above, but the regions where they obtain are different. What is slightly harder is this: in some regions there is more than one (    ) satisfying the FOC's, so we have to check the SOC's, and also compare  across local maximizers to find the global maximizer. See the Supplemental Appendix.
While in equilibrium   can be too big or too small, there is no analogous result for  . It is easy to show  can be too small -i.e., we can have  = 0 in equilibrium when the planner wants  = 1 -but we did not find an example where  = 1 in equilibrium when the planner wants  = 0 (although we did not prove it is impossible). We understand the situation in terms of coordination.
When  = 0,  is willing to sell  to  in principle, but not in practice, because inventories take too long to replace. If every  were to change to  = 1, however,   and hence   would rise, and then would  would trade  to  since it would take less time to replace.
Moreover, when equilibria with  = 0 and  = 1 coexist, the latter is better.
Although the result does not depend on this, it is easiest to see when   =   = 1, since then welfare is unambiguously measured by   =  0 in any equilibrium with    0.
11 In this case, note that the two equilibria imply
Hence,   ( = 1)    ( = 0), consistent with interpreting  = 0 as a coordination problem. We summarize as follows:
Proposition 5 Similar to goods markets, in asset markets the efficient outcome exists and is generically unique, and equilibrium can have   too big or too small.
Different from goods markets, we cannot set the 's so that equilibrium is efficient.
Also, when equilibria with  = 0 and  = 1 coexist the latter is better.
Asset Market Dynamics
It is convenient here to work in ( 1  ∆) space, where  1 =    is the measure of inventories held by , which is predetermined at any point in time , while ∆ =  1 −  0 represents (beliefs about) the value of inventories. Then the equilibrium conditions can be collapsed to a two-dimensional dynamical system in ( 1  ∆).
For    0, the Appendix shows the unique steady state is a saddle point: for any initial condition  1 = 1 there is a unique∆ such that starting at ¡ 1 ∆ ¢ the system transits to steady state; and for any other∆ the system follows an explosive path. In other words, when    0 equilibrium, not only steady state, is unique.
For    0, the dynamics are more complicated. 12 To begin, as in the steady state analysis, let us assume type  can at any  become type , but must start with 0 inventory. Next, since type  agents really make no decisions, we can ignore them and focus on
The interesting case concerns    0, where
, where we can solve explicitly for
Next, subtracting (16)- (17), we geṫ
Now  =  (∆) is 1, [0 1] or 0 as ∆ −  is positive, 0 or negative, which we can insert along with  0 ( 1  ∆) into (18) to arrive aṫ 
Then, as is standard, given an initial 1 equilibrium defined as a bounded and nonnegative path ( 1  ∆) satisfying (19)-(20) (boundedness comes from the transversality condition; see, e.g., Rocheteau and Wright 2013).
We know that for some parameters there are 3 steady states, as shown in 
The right panel is similar, except that for any 1 in a large range, depending on initial beliefs, the system can transit to
or a cycle around it.
13 13 One can also construct stochastic (sunspot) equilibria using standard methods. Consider a random variable  that affects nothing fundamental but could affect behavior if agents believe it will. According to a Poisson process  switches from  1 to  2 at rate  1 and switches back at rate  2 , and at each switch the economy jumps from one (bounded) trajectory in Fig. 4 to another. Now given rational expectations about the jumps, Fig. 4 would actually change, but it is qualitatively similar if the 's are not too big. In particular, when the phase plane looks like the right panel, one equilibrium has the economy jumping between paths approximately given by the stable manifolds of the steady states with  = 1 and  = 0, with  's behavior and the direction of the inventory path switching whenever ∆ crosses . For more discussion see, e.g., Kaplan and Menzio (2016) who study different but related kinds of models.
Thus our intermediated asset market not only has multiple steady states, but dynamic indeterminacy and excess volatility (fluctuations in endogenous variables when fundamentals are constant). It is also subject to fragility, where a small change in fundamentals can lead to a structural change in equilibrium. Similar results appear in other models, but the economics is different, arising here from complementarities in trading strategies and endogenous market composition.
Robustness
The results are robust on several dimensions. First, in the Appendix we extend the uniqueness result for    0 to the case where we give multiplicity a fighting chance by going beyond linear utility and steady state. This is relevant because some search models display multiplicity if one considers nonlinear utility or dynamics, but not if one imposes linearity and looks only at steady state (e.g.,
Wright and Wong 2014; Trejos and Wright 2016); that is not the case here.
One commentator conjectured that treating types  and  asymmetrically might be driving some results. We think our setup is natural, but it is true that: (i)  gets payoff  from  while  gets payoff    from ; and (ii) after acquiring it  can get another , while  is restricted to {0 1}. So, consider instead: (i)  gets    from ; and (ii)  also is restricted to  ∈ {0 1}. This makes them symmetric, but without further modification, eventually all end users can end up with  and production shuts down. So, suppose that, when  acquires , he leaves the market to be replaced by a new  (we could also let  depreciate as discussed below).
To ease notation, set   =   = 1 and write
Hence,  and  trade when 's valuation is above  * , not surprisingly, but there are two points worth mention: first,      0 implies  *    , so it is not the case that  trades  to  iff      ; second,  * depends on the endogenous   , not merely parameters.
Other commentators conjectured that we do not need type , as similar multiplicities can occur with only  and . That is more delicate. One approach is to eliminate  and let agents choose to be either  or  , with   +   = 1.
Letting  now denote the probability  and  trade, we have
It is easy to check that as long as   6 = 0 the unique equilibrium has  = 1. For   = 0, multiplicity emerges, because then   =    and   = , so we can have   ∈ (0 1) as long as    = , and there are many combinations of (   ) satisfying this condition. But that is not interesting, because it only works at   = 0, and it is payoff irrelevant. So we do need  in this version.
A better conjecture by one referee is that a similar multiplicity may emerge without  when we give  a trade off between saving  and consuming it. This is plausible, since  consuming  is similar to  trading it away.  pursue it, suppose there are two types,  that can save or consume , and  that can produce it or be a nonparticipant. In the Supplemental Appendix we confirm this works: if  is more likely to consume , there will be more  searching for , which encourages participation by  and makes  more likely to consume.
Multiplicity can emerge. This changed our views, given we previously thought middlemen were necessary for this kind of multiplicity; they are not. Yet it does 22 not change a main conclusion: in models with middlemen, it is still true that multiplicity and complicated dynamics emerge only if    0 and only if market composition is endogenous.
Another extension is to let  hold inventories  ∈ {0 1 }, where 1   
∞.
14 Let n = ( 0   1    ), where   is the measure of  with  units of . As Fig. 7 shows,  moves up the distribution by one unit at rate   =   , since he trades whenever he meets  (we maintain that  can only produce one unit per meeting). Also,  moves down one unit at rate  
. Then the second reduces to
Continuing in this way ∀ ∈ {1 2} we get
Note the last equation holds automatically when the others hold, so we replace it with
This is the closed-form for n given any τ and   . 15 Let  () =   be 's return from holding  units, with
is linear only to focus on nonlinearities coming from endogenous behavior. Then
Thus  with   0 gets a flow   , gets a share   of the surplus when he trades with , suffers from depreciation at rate , and increases  when he meets  as 15 The process for  is reminiscent of the one for currency holdings in monetary models with  ∈ {0 1 2  }, like Green and Zhou (1998), Camera and Corbae (1999) or Berentsen (2002) . However, those papers need to justify agents' decisions to trade 1 unit of money at a time, while here trading 1 unit of  is guaranteed by technology and preferences. long as   . Similarly, we have
Note that equilibrium is generically unique when   is exogenous, because while τ affects n it does not affect (23) . Also, as in the baseline model, multiplicity obviously requires    0. It is not hard to solve the model numerically and look for multiplicity with   endogenous and    0. First note that   is nonlinear in , and to see why this matters, consider a special case that we call reservation equilibria, defined as follows: for some  * ∈ {1 2 },   = 1 iff  ≥  * . One might think all equilibria have this property, which would be true if   were linear, but   is not linear. Fig. 8 , drawn for  = 5, shows
and note that when ∆  is increasing (decreasing)   is convex (concave); hence   starts convex and becomes concave as  increases. 16 In the left panel, with
is an equilibrium, and in fact the unique equilibrium for these parameters, but it is not a reservation equilibria ( trades when  = 1
but not when  = 2). In the right panel, with   = 007, τ = (0 0 1 1 1) is a reservation equilibrium. Also shown are histograms for n and the value of   . 
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It is not hard to get multiplicity. The left panel of Figure 9 shows the result of checking all 2  candidate equilibria for  = 100 for each point on a grid in (   ) space. 17 The blue region has one equilibrium, the green has two, and yellow three. In this case they all happen to be reservation equilibria, implying multiplicity even within the special class, but one can also find reservation and other equilibria coexisting The intuition is similar to  = 1. First, one can show higher   lowers   and increases   for  6 = . Also, setting   =  ∀ and increasing  twists the inventory distribution -i.e., there is an   such that   decreases for     and increases for  ≤   . So when  is more inclined to trade with , in the sense that   = 1 for more values of , a random middleman is more likely to have lower makes multiplicity possible even when  is big, and shows that insights from our tractable benchmark model go through for   1.
Conclusion
This project continued the development of search-based theories of intermedia- There are many extensions and applications one can imagine for future work, but we think the existing findings already taught us a lot about search theory and about intermediation.
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Appendix A: Payment Frictions and Dynamics
To begin let us suppose  00 ()  0. This is interesting because now we can have  ()  , implying the cost to the payer exceeds the value to the payee, which discourages intermediation because it requires two payments,  to  and  to , rather than one,  to  . Thus we can interpret the model in terms of payment frictions. Given that, we can show uniqueness in goods markets also holds with nonlinear utility. For tractability, let us use Kalai's (1977) "proportional" bargaining solution, which has several advantages in related models (Aruoba et al. 2007 ).
To reduce notation, set   =   = 1, which is fairly innocuous since type  really plays a very minro role anyway, and convenient because it implies   = 0
and   =   = . Also, let  ≡ () and write the dynamic programming equations as
The definition of equilibrium is similar, but the analysis is harder. 
and  0 is given by the bargaining solution for   at  = 0.
Lemma 9 A class 1 equilibrium exists iff   ≤    and   ≤  (  ), where
and is the bargaining solution for   at  =.
Lemma 10 A class 2 equilibrium exists iff (0  0 )  0  (), where is defined in the proof. The main complication comes from the fact that, with a general  (), we cannot eliminate   from the above conditions. Hence, we work with two curves in (   ) space, one representing bargaining and one representing the choice to be type  or  . Setting  0 =   implies a quadratic that solves for
where is the discriminant. This defines a function  = (  ), with  for "occupational choice." One can check   ' −(   −   ), where  '  means  and  have the same sign. As shown in Fig. 10 , this traces a curve in (   ) space that slopes up or down, depending on the sign of
Next, use (??)-(??) to solve for  1 −  0 and eliminate it from the bargaining solution to get   = (), where  is for "bargaining." The result is
where
This traces a downward-sloping curve. Now we have
space,  is increasing and concave,  is decreasing and concave, and
Proposition 6 With    0 and  00  0 equilibrium exists and is generically unique.
Based on this is it not hard to show the results look a lot like Fig. 1 except now the boundaries of the different regions are nonlinear. In any case, the point it that uniqueness with    0 extends holds to nonlinear  ().
Now consider going dynamics in class 2 equilibrium, still allowing  00  0 and setting   =   = 1, so again   =   = ,   = 0 and  = (). Also, here it is more convenient to work with the 's, rather than , so let the state variable be  1 , the measure of  with , while  0 =   −  1 . Theṅ
The other state is ∆ =  1 −  0 capturing agents beliefs about the value of acquiring . The bargaining solution is
While this system appears comples, it can be reduced to something manageable as follows: First, notice   =  0 ∀ implies  = 0 ∀. Then the dynamic programming equations imply that for   ∈ (0 1 −   ) we have
They also imply
Using (34) and simplifying this, we geṫ
Thus (32) and (35) These have slopes
One can check the slope of∆ = 0 is strictly positive, and while the slope of 1 = 0 can be positive or negative, when it is positive it is steeper than the∆ = 0 curve. (c) two-roots, which requires (c1)
In case (a), it is easy to see
and
As these conditions are contradictory, case (a) cannot occur.
Turning to case (c),
which is redundant given (c1) and that equilibrium requires that   ≤  . Also, (c3) and (c4) ⇒
Finally, (c5) is equivalent to   0, where  is the discriminant of ().
We now show  +     −      0 is necessary for (c3) and (c4). Suppose 
shown in the right panel of Fig. 12 Similarly, let S 2 be the set consistent with (c5). To characterize S 2 , the discriminant of (), , can itself be written as a quadratic in   given   ,
Since 1  0, is strictly convex. Also, it is straightforward to show that It can be shown that( 
, as in the right panel of Fig. 13 .
Hence, (c) requires
ignoring terms with  that strengthen the inequality. This implies
But the LHS is negative and the RHS positive -a contradiction. ¥ Lemma 5: We derive
One can check this vanishes when   =  . Moreover, 
The derivative of this is proportional to
where  '  means  and  have the same sign. When
First, it is obvious that the efficient and equilibrium outcomes correspond in general only if
, and   is the bargaining solution.
There are again three cases for(   ) = 0: (a) one root with(0  0 )  0 (); (b) one root with(0  0 )  0 (); and (c) two roots,
As in Lemma 3, case (a) is impossible. Also noticẽ
and (c4), we have
We need this positive at  =, which means     ≡    −  ()    , and
and (c4) are not binding. Also, (c2) and (c3) imply   is between  and  , which holds iff
Assume this is true and consider (c5).
To get  * , solve  = 0 to get
For (c5) we seek the set of   such that(  )  0. There are three possibili-
This rules out (c5.1) and (c5.2). To check To show  and  cannot cross more than once, write 
If       equilibrium is obviously unique. If       , we claim     −1   when they cross. To verify this, insert  =  * to get
where is the discriminant of. Using (30) to replace p and  =  * , we get Finally, for the properties of  and , derive
Thus  (·) is decreasing and concave in 
and notice steady state implies
We now consider each candidate equilibrium. 
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The best response condition for  = 0 is  
It is easy to check   1 ≤  1 iff   ≤ (  ) where (  ) is defined in (14) . The condition for   ∈ (0 1 −   ),   =  0 , now implies
Now    1 −   is the binding condition for   ∈ (0 1 −   ), and that holds iff
Equilibrium 2  : Consider next  ∈ (0 1) and   ∈ (0 1−  ). Now  ∈ (0 1)
Solve this for
One can check   ∈ (0 1 −   ) implies
